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Humphrey III, Atty. City Atty. William R. Sagstuen, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant. Hubert H. Brennan, Thomas Erik Bailey, Asst. Paul, for amicus Atty. Appellant Otis Manning challenges his conviction for violating the sex offender registration law, Minn. He contends that applying the statute to a felon who was convicted before it took effect violates the ex post facto prohibitions of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
We affirm. In , Manning was convicted of fourth degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to 15 months in prison. Execution of the sentence was stayed, and he was placed on probation for five years. In January , Manning violated the terms of his probation and was ordered to serve the month sentence.
Laws ch. The registration form that Manning completed included his physical description, address, and information about his conviction. He ed the form in July shortly after his release from prison. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Following a trial on stipulated facts, Manning was found guilty. Does Minn. In evaluating constitutional challenges, the interpretation of statutes is a question of law. In re Blilie, N. Minnesota statutes are pd constitutional and will be declared unconstitutional "only when absolutely necessary.
Local No. Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. When examining a state constitutional provision, a decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting a parallel provision of the federal constitution is of persuasive, although not controlling, force.
State v. Fuller, N. An ex post facto law "renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed. Blair, Minn. More specifically, to constitute an ex post facto law, a statute must: 1 punish as a crime an act which was innocent when committed; 2 increase the burden of punishment for a crime after its commission; or 3 deprive one charged with a crime of a defense that was available when it was committed. Collins v.
Youngblood, U. Manning argues that the registration requirement makes his punishment more burdensome. We disagree. As a threshold matter, we note that the statute is applied to Manning retroactively. The legislature provided that the statute applies to offenders released from prison after August 1, , regardless of the date of the offense.
Additionally, the state concedes that the statute is applied retroactively in this case. In determining whether the registration statute increases the burden of Manning's punishment, we must determine if Minn. We first ask whether the legislature intended to punish an offender for a past act, "or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation. Braisted, U. Here, the legislature did not indicate whether the statute was intended to be punitive or regulatory.
Consequently, to determine whether the statute's effect is punitive, we look to factors enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, U. The factors are:. Noble, Ariz. The remaining factors are helpful in our analysis. Registration as an Affirmative Disability or Restraint. Manning contends that the registration requirement disables him by restricting freedom of movement, increasing police scrutiny, and subjecting him to live within the shadow of his crime.
Although offenders must give notice if they relocate, this requirement alone does not restrain their movement. An offender's conviction is a matter of public record regardless of the registration. Furthermore, the registration information is "private data" and "may be used only for law enforcement purposes. Similar sex offender registration statutes have been upheld in states where access to registration information is less restrictive than in Minnesota.
See, e. Code Ann. Ward, Wash. Registration Historically Regarded as Punishment. Registration has not traditionally been viewed as punishment. See generally Lambert v. California, U. Governments often use varying methods of registration as a way for law enforcement agencies to have easy access to necessary information.
Additionally, the fact that the registration information is confidential lessens the similarity between this statute and traditions in which "registration" amounted to public scorn. Traditional Aims of Punishment. The next relevant Mendoza-Martinez factor examines whether the law promotes the traditional deterrent function of punishment.
The notion here is that a registered sex offender is less likely to commit a crime if police can easily ascertain his whereabouts. We acknowledge that the registration may have a minimal deterrent effect, but we agree with the Washington Supreme Court that an offender "may be deterred from the fact of conviction and punishment served, whether he is required to register or not. Relationship to Nonpunitive Purpose. Under the last two factors, the statute must not be excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose.
The registration law clearly has a nonpunitive purpose: to help police investigations. See People v. Adams, Ill. Manning contends that the statute burdens former offenders by defining them as members "of a small and more notorious group more likely to be questioned and investigated when local sex crimes occur. The mere fact that offenders are registered, however, does not reduce their constitutional rights. Registrants are entitled to the same due process protections as they would be absent the registration. See Noble, P. It is important to note that only convicted felons are required to register.
In re Reed, 33 Cal. Consideration of the Mendoza-Martinez factors le us to conclude that the registration statute does not impose an affirmative disability, has not historically been viewed as punishment, and does not advance the traditional aims of punishment. Minnesota's sex offender registration statute is not punitive and therefore does not violate federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. When a person who is required to register under this section is sentenced, the court shall tell the person of the duty to register under this section. The court shall require the person to read and a form stating that the duty of the person to register under this section has been explained.
Registration procedure. An offender is deemed to change addresses when the offender remains at a new address for longer than two weeks and evinces an intent to take up residence there. The agent shall, within three business days after receipt of this information, forward it to the bureau of criminal apprehension.
Contents of registration. The registration provided to the corrections agent must consist of a statement in writing ed by the person, giving information required by the bureau of criminal apprehension, and a fingerprint card and photograph of the person if these have not already been obtained in connection with the offense that triggers registration. Within three days, the corrections agent shall forward the statement, fingerprint card, and photograph to the bureau of criminal apprehension. The bureau shall send one copy to the appropriate law enforcement authority that will have jurisdiction where the person will reside on release or discharge.
Criminal penalty. A person required to register under this section who violates any of its provisions is guilty of a misdemeanor. Registration period. Use of information. The information provided under this section is private data on individuals under section The information may be used only for law enforcement purposes. Law enforcement authority. For purposes of this section, a law enforcement authority means, with respect to a home rule charter or statutory city, the chief of police, and with respect to an unincorporated area, the sheriff of the county.
Prisoners from other states. When the state accepts a prisoner from another state under a reciprocal agreement under the interstate compact authorized by section See Minn. Under a amendment to the statute, offenders now register at the time of sentencing. Manning State v. Manning Annotate this Case. Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
May 30, Review Denied July 20, The factors are: Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is asable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose ased.
As the Arizona Supreme Court noted when it addressed this same issue, the Mendoza-Martinez test focus[es] appropriate attention on the effects of the registration requirement on convicted sex offenders and on the rationality between the requirement and its purported non-punitive function.Local sex Manning
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